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Positional goods are a subset of economic goods whose consumption (and subsequent utility), also conditioned by Giffen-like pricing, depends negatively on consumption of those same goods by others. In particular, for these goods the value is at least in part (if not exclusively) a function of its ranking in desirability by others, in comparison to substitutes. The extent to which a good's value depends on such a ranking is referred to as its ''positionality''. ==The concept== Although Thorstein Veblen emphasized the importance of one’s relative position in society with reference to the concept of conspicuous leisure and consumption, it was Fred Hirsch who coined the concept of the “positional good,” in ''Social Limits to Growth''. He explained that the positional economy is composed of "all aspects of goods, services, work positions and other social relationships that are either (1) scarce in some absolute or socially imposed sense or (2) subject to congestion and crowding through more extensive use" (Hirsch, 1977: 27). Hence, Hirsch distinguished categories of positional goods. Some depend, essentially, on their relative positions (pride of superiority, status and power); others, such as land for leisure activities or land for suburban housing, are positional merely because their total amount is fixed. However, land is valued at least in part for its absolute contribution to productivity, which does not ''derive'' from its relative ranking. Thus, some economists (such as Robert H. Frank and Ugo Pagano) only include goods (like status and power) which are valued specifically because of their relative quality. Hirsch’s main contribution is his assertion that positional goods are inextricably linked to social scarcity - social scarcity relates to the relative standings of different individuals and arises not from physical or natural limitations, but from social factors; for instance, the land in Inter-Provincial Montioni Park is physically scarce, while political leadership positions are socially scarce. The broad theme of Hirsch's book was, he told ''The New York Times'', that material growth can "no longer deliver what has long been promised for it—to make everyone middle-class". The concept of positional good explains why, as economic growth improves overall quality of life at any particular level, doing "better" than how your grandparents lived does not translate automatically into doing "well", if there are as many or more people ahead of you in the economic hierarchy. For example, if you are the first in your family to get a college degree, you are doing better. But if you were at the bottom of your class at a weak school, you may find yourself less eligible for a job than your grandfather, who was only a high school graduate. That is, competition for positional goods is a zero-sum game: Attempts to acquire them can only benefit one player at the expense of others. It is worthy to underline that in the case of positional goods, agents benefiting from a positional good do not take into account the externalities of their respective sufferers. That is, in the case of "public () goods, the consequences of this failure implies that an agent consuming the public good does not get paid for other people’s consumption; in the case of a positional () good, the equivalent failure implies that an agent consuming positive amounts is not charged for the negative consumption of other agent’s consumption" (Pagano 1999:71). That is, while, in the case of public goods, we have the standard underinvestment problem in their supply, because excluding individuals from externalities that have the “same sign” may turn out to be impossible, by contrast, in the case of positional goods, we have a problem of over-provision, because all agents may try to consume positive amounts of these goods, neglecting to consider the externality on others. For public goods, an under-supply, for positional goods, it signifies an over-supply. In other words, in positional competitions, people work harder and consume more than they would under optimal conditions. Some economists, such as Robert Frank, argue that positional goods create ''externalities'' and that "positional arms races" can result for goods that might boost one's social status relative to others. This phenomenon, Frank argues, is clearly bad for society, and thus government can improve social welfare by imposing a high luxury tax on certain luxury goods to correct for the externality and mitigate the posited social waste.〔• Robert H. Frank (2008). "consumption externalities," ''The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics'', 2nd Edition. (Abstract. ) • _____ (1997). "The Frame of Reference as a Public Good," ''Economic Journal'', 107(445), pp. (1832–1847. ) • _____ (2005). "Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses," ''American Economic Review'', 95(2), pp. (137-141 ) (close Bookmarks tab & press +).〕 However, in some cases it may be less clear that such government intervention is warranted in response to these externalities. For example, in certain cases, such government actions can potentially impede improvements in living standards and innovation. Technological advance itself is possible in part because wealthy individuals are willing to purchase new and untested goods. There is a certain experimentation and risk that accompany luxury goods, and if they are found to be useful they may eventually be mass-produced and made affordable to the common person: one era's luxuries are another's commonplace goods. In short, the negative positional externality can be compensated by the public goods of infant industry effects and research and development.〔Andrew Kashdan and Daniel B. Klein (2006). "Assume the Positional: Comment on Robert Frank," ''Econ Journal Watch'', 3(3), pp. 412-34. (Abstract. )〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Positional good」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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